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A B S T R A C T
Complex and inter-related factors explain the excessive use of fertilizer observed in many intensive
farming systems in China, and hence act as barriers to development of a comprehensive policy and
intervention framework for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from agriculture (DWPA). This review
provides an original and contemporary synthesis of these factors that is broader, deeper and more inter-
related than existing assessments. The analysis conﬁrms that DWPA cannot be addressed by single
regulatory or policy measures. There is a need to develop a mitigation framework that encompasses
central policy directives, reform in governance at local level, an enabling regulatory environment,
horizontal and vertical coordination in food supply chains, unbiased incentives for efﬁcient fertilizer use
and protection of water resources, enhanced agricultural, food safety and environmental education for
farmers and consumers, and engagement of multiple actors beyond government.
ã 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Nutrient losses from agriculture are a major constituent of
diffuse water pollution (Norse, 2005). The costs to society of diffuse
water pollution from agriculture (DWPA) can include environ-
mental and ecosystem damage, lost aquaculture and ﬁsheries
income, and increased treatment costs for drinking water (Norse
et al., 2001; Norse, 2005). In China environmental impacts of
DWPA are manifest in the widespread eutrophication of lakes,
elevated nutrient concentrations in groundwater and soil acidiﬁ-
cation (Cui et al., 2014), while approximately 300 million rural
residents lack access to safe drinking water (Liu and Yang, 2012). In
2009, 57% of the nitrogen (N) and 69% of the phosphorus (P)
entering watercourses were from agriculture (MEP, 2010). A
decrease in soil pH of 0.5 units in the major crop production
regions over two decades has been attributed mainly to excessive
application of N fertilizers (Guo et al., 2010). Excessive use of
fertilizers also contributes to greenhouse gas emissions (Liu et al.,
2011).
China uses more fertilizer than any other country (FAOSTAT,
2014). Increased use of chemical fertilizers and other inputs has
contributed to increased grain productivity since 1978 (Table 1;
also Carter et al., 2012; FORHEAD, 2014) but much evidence now
indicates that fertilizer use could be reduced in many cropping
situations with minimal or zero impact on crop yields (see for
example: Ju et al., 2009; Rahn, 2010; Zhang and Powlson, 2010).
Over application for cereals varies by region but can average one
third in excess of crops needs, and be even higher for high value
horticultural crops (Zhang and Powlson, 2010; Rahn, 2010).1
Table 1 shows that use of chemical fertilizer in China increased
fourfold from 1978 to 2012. Other countries shown for comparison
largely reduced fertilizer use over the same period, whilst also
demonstrating increased cereal yields.
In many intensively farmed areas an accumulation of surplus N
and P in soils now constitutes both a resource to be exploited by
farmers and a source of DWPA. Returns to increasing fertilizer use
are diminishing (Carter et al., 2012) and reductions in use would
support national priorities to reduce water pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions, and could reduce farm costs (Garnet
and Wilkes, 2014). However, overuse of fertilizer continues for
reasons not yet fully understood and explained (Norse, 2005;
FORHEAD, 2014; Holdaway, 2014).
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1 Although excessive use of fertilizers is common regional variation remains
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This paper addresses this issue through a comprehensive
review of the inter-related factors that contribute to excessive use
of fertilizer in China. ‘Political’, ‘policy’, ‘structural’ and ‘behav-
ioural’ barriers to improved fertilizer management and mitigation
of DWPA are identiﬁed, along with priority agendas for policy and
further research. The review is broad and multi-disciplinary to
provide an original synthesis of factors inadequately inter-related
by existing literature. Critical analysis of the literature has been
enhanced by insights from purposive semi-structured interviews
with expert informants, ﬁeld visits to intensive farming areas,
three exploratory focus group meetings with farmers and
township level agricultural extension agents, and workshop
discussions with higher level agricultural ofﬁcials and researchers.
2. Technical and institutional constraints to improved
management of fertilizer in China
2.1. Political and policy barriers
2.1.1. Policy commitment and effectiveness for environmental
improvement
Many authors and commentators cite that there is growing
environmental awareness and public demand for improvements in
environmental quality in China; though little research has been
published on public awareness of, and demand for improvement
in, environmental quality and ecosystem services. It can, however,
be observed that many people want better controls as protests over
environmental issues have become commonplace (Economist,
2014b). Urban air pollution is often foremost amongst public
concerns, but soil and water pollution and food contamination also
receive attention in public protests and the media.
Public demand has been matched by high level policy
announcements. For example, the Law on Water Pollution
Prevention and Control revised in 2008 made provisions for
control of pollution of drinking-water sources, industrial pollution,
agricultural non-point source pollution and ecological damage.
The Five-Year Plan (2011–2016) articulated energy-saving goals
and targets for increased forest coverage. In 2014 the national
Environmental Protection Law of 1989 was amended and more
punitive penalties set for polluting companies and negligent
executives or ofﬁcials failing to meet environmental regulations
(Marquis et al., 2011; Economist, 2014b). Since 1979, signiﬁcant
legislation for environmental protection has made up about ten
percent of laws passed by the Congress (Wang and Wang, 2011),
though legislation to protect agricultural lands, wetlands and river
basins is still inadequate (Marquis et al., 2011).
Despite public demand and this evident policy intent effective
implementation of environmental protection is often lacking.
Marquis et al., 2011, identify a ‘decoupling’ of regulation and
enforcement in China; i.e. stringent regulations responding to
public demand are weakly enforced. Explanations given are that,
although the central government issues strict regulations,
monitoring and enforcement of these are undertaken by local
governments that tend to give greater priority to economic growth.
At both national and local levels the supporting and advocacy roles
of civil society are underdeveloped given the political restrictions
placed on the activities of non-governmental actors including
lawyers, the judiciary, journalists, and NGOs. Finally, at all levels of
government there is a fragmentation of authority in relation to the
environment, and a lack of monitoring and transparency.
Environmental legislation in China is also criticised for “an
outdated underlying philosophy, inadequate scope, lack of substantive
content and poor functionality” (Wang and Wang, 2011, p. 162);
there is inadequate support for the objective of sustainable
development, whilst a preference for generality over speciﬁcity
compromises practical application and enforceability. Thus
responsibilities may not be clearly assigned by level and agency,
enforcement agencies have considerable discretionary power
despite shortcomings in technical capacity, and there is weak
coordination with partner agencies. Guidance issued and enforce-
ment tend to be inconsistent and less than comprehensive, while
penalties are typically insufﬁciently severe to ensure compliance.
“A growth-ﬁrst mentality, ﬂaws within the judiciary system itself,
poverty, and inadequate environmental laws, mean that China’s
judicial system is still incapable of providing robust protection of
environmental rights against abuses” (Wang and Wang, 2011;
p. 169).
2.1.2. Prioritisation of food security and economic growth
China has over 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of global
cultivated land (Sun et al., 2012), and it is notable that ‘Policy
Document Number 1’ from central government addresses agricul-
ture and rural development ﬁrst each year (Maidor and Ma, 2014).
Food production and food security remain the primary objectives
Table 1
A comparison of fertilizer consumption and cereal yields in China and selected countries post 1978.
Country 1978 2012 Change
China Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, million tonnes nutrients)a 10.6 53.4 404%
Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, kg per ha of arable land and permanent crops)b 106 436 311%
Major cereal yields, kg/hac Wheat
paddy rice
maize
1845
3981
2803
4987
6775
5870
170%
70%
109%
Republic of Korea Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, million tonnes nutrients)a 0.82 0.48 41%
Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, kg per ha of arable land and permanent crops)b 369 277 25%
Major cereal yields, kg/hac Wheat
paddy rice
maize
2089
6938
3246
3910
6988
4894
87%
1%
51%
United Kingdom Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, million tonnes nutrients)a 2.13 1.46 31%
Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, kg per ha of arable land and permanent crops)b 303 233 23%
Major cereal yields, kg/hac Wheat 5253 6657 27%
United States Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, million tonnes nutrients)a 20.36 20.12 1%
Fertilizer consumption (total NPK, kg per ha of arable land and permanent crops)b 106 127 20%
Major cereal yields, kg/hac Wheat
paddy rice
maize
2114
5026
6342
3115
8349
7744
47%
66%
22%
a Source: total NPK for chemical fertilizer products (not including organic manures) International Fertilizer Industry Association, IFADATA, electronic database, at www.
fertilizer.org/Statistics, downloaded 5 January 2015.
b Source: area of arable land and permanent crops from FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, Statistics Division, at www.faostat3.fao.org/
home/E, downloaded 5 January 2015.
c Source: FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, Statistics Division, at www.faostatfao.org/home/E, downloaded 5 January 2015.
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of the Ministry of Agriculture. These objectives are translated into
targets and production incentives (subsidies) administered by
regional Bureaus of Agriculture (Ma et al., 2013). Self-sufﬁciency
in the key protein and energy providing foods – wheat, rice, maize,
livestock and aquaculture products – has been seen as a prerequisite
for food security (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014), although the ofﬁcial goal
is now 95% self-sufﬁciency in essential grains given acceptance that
complete self-sufﬁciency is impractical (Information Ofﬁce of the
State Council of the PRC, 1996).
In Chinese ‘liangshi anquan’ translates as either food security or
grain security, but for ofﬁcial policy is mainly about boosting grain
production (Hongzhou, 2011). This emphasis has dominated
agricultural policy in China and intersects with fertilizer use and
DWPA in several ways. Prior to the reforms of the household
responsibility system in the late 1970s collective farms were
expected to increase production to meet local and national food
self-sufﬁciency targets, and most of them responded by increasing
fertilizer use (Sun et al., 2012). Agricultural production has since
expanded rapidly over 30 years (Carter et al., 2012), and much of
the increase results from increased use of chemical fertilizers. For
example, a signiﬁcant correlation is observable between the
annual use of synthetic N fertilizer and grain production (Sun et al.,
2012). Rapid development of vegetable production has also greatly
increased use of fertilizers and pesticides. Even today the
‘psychology’ of many farmers and ofﬁcials remains one of seeking
to maximise production. This is particularly evident in rural areas
most dependent on their agricultural economy, where signiﬁcant
trade-offs may be perceived to exist between local economic
development and environmental protection (CCICED, 2012).
The preoccupation with ‘grain security’ has also led to
regulation to protect the area of land under cultivation. Arable
land has declined to 121.7 million hectares in 2012 from a peak in
1991 of 132.4 million.2 Urban and industrial development is most
rapid in eastern and coastal provinces where the most fertile land
is disproportionately located (Ho and Lin, 2004; World Bank, 2014;
Daquan et al., 2015). Urban infrastructure and property develop-
ment contribute strongly to local government revenue and
economic growth is an overriding goal for local ofﬁcials (FORHEAD,
2014)3, whilst environmental legislation is weak. Both conversion
of arable land to non-agricultural uses and mandated targets for
cultivated area inevitably push at least some farming onto
marginal land where the pressure to maintain high yields can
result in high application rates for fertilizers and pesticides.
2.1.3. Food safety and consumer-led drivers of environmental
improvement
Popular food safety concerns are fuelled, at least in part, by
media stories of acute instances of food-related illness and by fear
of diseases such as cancer. Some international comparative surveys
are also cited as evidence that the environmental motivations of
Chinese consumers can be high (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014). Anxiety
is heightened by a lack of reliable public information and
communication of risks, and by some evidence of corruption of
ofﬁcials associated with food safety issues (FORHEAD, 2014). With
the exception of heavy metals and other toxic chemicals in
pesticides, DWPA is primarily a threat to drinking water safety,
agricultural sustainability and ecosystems rather than food safety.
However, overly-intensive farming can contribute to degradation
of soil in ways that increase the risk that heavy metals will affect
food crops and animal feeds.
Thus food and drinking water safety could be drivers for
mitigation of DWPA in China, but although the need for greater
public oversight is recognized other mechanisms to enable this are
lacking. Regulatory systems and safety standards need to be
developed, but models from other countries are often context
dependent in terms of institutions, governance, capacity needs and
diet, and not readily transferable to China. Consumer associations
are lacking, and policies and institutions developed in China, such
as its new Food and Drug Administration, need to build capacity in
monitoring and enforcement to become effective (Garnet and
Wilkes, 2014).
Certiﬁcation of food production processes based on environ-
mental criteria does exist as ‘green food’, ‘organic’ and ‘hazard-free’
certiﬁcations. The ﬁrst – ‘green food’ – requires standards to be met
for the use of pesticides, production methods and residue testing,
and may achieve a price premium of approximately 12% compared
to conventional produce (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014). ‘Green’
certiﬁcation is estimated to apply to about 10 million hectares
of agricultural land (Paull, 2008). Organic certiﬁcation began in the
late 1980s (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014) and 1.9 million hectares were
certiﬁed by 2011. ‘Hazard-free’ certiﬁcation, introduced in 2001 in
response to contaminated food incidents (Garnet and Wilkes,
2014), aims to prevent illegal use of toxic agricultural chemicals,
and pesticide residues in excess of standards (Taylor, 2008). It is
estimated to apply to some 21 million hectares of agricultural land
(Paull, 2008). Thus in total, eco-certiﬁcation across all three
schemes, applies to at most some 6–7% of China’s agricultural
production by area (Paull, 2008; Willer and Lernoud, 2014), while
trust in certiﬁcations may also be weak, as evidenced by frequent
media reports of incorrect labelling and poor enforcement of
standards (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014).
Some afﬂuent middle class consumers turn to ‘short food
supply chains’. Community supported agriculture schemes more
directly link producers and consumers; for example, farmers’
markets, direct internet selling, farm visits, farm-restaurants and
farm-to-school supply chains can build trust without third party
certiﬁcation (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014). Beyond these, improving
vertical coordination for product safety in supply chains depends
on ability to enforce farm production and processing standards.
Long-term supply contracts and modern supply chains are
indicators for this, but testing of produce, provision of extension
services by buyers and reach into rural areas are all limited (Huang
et al., 2008).
Given the number of people for whom food expenditure is a
high proportion of income, trade-offs between food safety and cost
need to be balanced whilst seeking to ensure universal access to
safe and affordable food (FORHEAD, 2014). Consumer willingness
and ability to pay a premium for improved food safety will
determine the feasibility of upgrading production methods and
supply chains in ways that could inﬂuence farmer behaviour.
Research on this issue to date is mainly limited to surveys of urban
consumers and demand for organic products, with less knowledge
available for rural populations, lesser cities and consumers
purchasing from traditional vendors and wet markets rather than
supermarkets (FORHEAD, 2014). The demography of consumption
patterns in China is also complex and rapidly changing. Age
income, education and lifestyle all affect preferences for improve-
ments in food safety and environmental quality, and similarly
await more systematic research (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014).
2.1.4. Limitations in governance and central-local relations
The central government communicates its priorities to lower
levels of government through national development strategies, the
ﬁve-year plans and targets such as ‘grain security’. These indicate
which economic activities are appropriate and become manifest in
the incentives that guide local government. Over three decades the
2 Area of arable land and permanent crops, source: FAOSTAT, Food and
Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, Statistics Division, at www.
faostat3.fao.org/home/E, downloaded 8 January 2015.
3 See Section 2.1.4 below.
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intense growth orientation of national policy has been the primary
inﬂuence and criterion for local government decision making and
career progression of local ofﬁcials (Marquis et al., 2011).
China’s civil service became more oriented towards merit and
performance management with the formalisation of the objective
responsibility system (ORS) from 1995 (Burns and Zhou, 2010).
Naturally, ofﬁcials tend to focus on goals that directly inﬂuence
their career opportunities while giving less priority to others.
Birney, 2014, has described this as a “rule of mandates” (p. 55) under
which the ofﬁcials are accountable to relative rather than ﬁxed
standards. In contrast to regulations mandates are directives, or
performance targets and indicators (Burns and Zhou, 2010), that
are hierarchically ranked. The continuing emphasis on targets such
as GDP growth and ‘grain security’ has meant that secondary
‘mandates’ such as environmental protection become conditional
on their compatibility with the higher priority mandate. High
economic growth rates, regardless of environmental and social
implications, bring promotions and political opportunities; whilst
environmental improvements become at best an optional consid-
eration in terms of both local priorities and the performance
evaluation of local leaders (Wang and Wang, 2011).
For example, Burns and Zhou, 2010, list the performance targets
of a township government in 2005. The priority and “functional”
(p. 15) targets included the value of agricultural production,
income targets for township enterprises, and revenue targets;
secondary to these was a vague target to protect farm land. As the
ORS has developed it has increasingly focused on measurable
targets for inputs and outputs, but little on outcomes such as
improving efﬁciency, equity or sustainability (Burns and Zhou,
2010).
The inﬂuence of the ORS on the behaviour of ofﬁcials should not
though be overstated. Structural constraints also impede align-
ment of incentives for ofﬁcers with ofﬁcial policy goals (Burns and
Zhou, 2010). Almost 60% of civil servants are employed at county
and township level where promotion opportunities are few and
pay differentials narrow, thus limiting these as a motivating factor.
As a performance management system the ORS is also undermined
by the compressed and relatively egalitarian structure of the local
civil service, by supervisors who empathise with subordinates
based on personal relationships rather than performance, and by
practices such as selling of positions and other forms of corruption
(Burns and Zhou, 2010). Thus in terms of ‘decoupling’ of
environmental policy from implementation the ORS may have a
dual effect. Where it works it emphasizes economic growth over
sustainability (as compounded by other factors discussed below),
and where it is ineffective it simply fails to translate ofﬁcial
environmental goals into action.
Local politics may compound these failings, as ofﬁcials can hold
joint appointments in both the Communist Party and administra-
tive bodies at local level, and functional decision making invariably
becomes subject to political inﬂuence. For example, a local agency
with responsibility for environmental protection that fully sought
to discharge its obligations and duties for pollution control could
adversely affect local economic growth rates and with this
performance evaluations for local cadres. Under such circum-
stance, both the state’s role in environmental monitoring and
supervision and the environmental rule of law may become
dysfunctional (Wang and Wang, 2011).
Fiscal and tax systems make local government revenue highly
dependent on GDP growth and thus combine with the ORS in
inﬂuencing behaviour by ofﬁcials (Keting, 2011). County level
government is required to implement central policy but funding
for this must often be found locally (Ellis and Turner, 2008).
Differences in local resources lead to variation in capacity for
service provision and policy implementation. In general, rural
areas have less capacity than urban areas, but across both there is a
continuum from poor and low-capacity to relatively rich and high-
capacity (FORHEAD, 2014). Local government dependence on local
industry for tax revenue and employment can make it difﬁcult to
close down or impose the costs of regulation on polluting
enterprises (FORHEAD 2014). This tends to exacerbate local
protectionism, government-business collusion, and competition
between localities to attract outside investments. Not only are
environmental protection ‘mandates’ treated as secondary, but it
may be in a local government’s best interests to ignore or violate
national environmental regulations in a “race to the bottom” with
its neighbours (Marquis et al., 2011, p. 43). Under these conditions,
despite the decentralised political system and local autonomy to
develop local policy solutions, it is unrealistic to expect local
governments to pursue ﬁscal discipline and take the initiative in
limiting economic expansion (Keting, 2011; FORHEAD 2014).
Whilst these observations are more relevant to urban and
industrial expansion than smallholder farming, they are important
features of the political and policy environment in which
approaches to mitigate DWPA must be developed and imple-
mented. They also become increasingly relevant to the larger scale
farming operations and agri-businesses that are rapidly emerging
in China (as discussed further below).
Inter-locality competition for investment and economic growth
can also under-value and limit cooperation across administrative
boundaries (Marquis et al., 2011). Managing shared resources and
the environment requires coordinated action by the varied
agencies with relevant responsibilities and budgets, yet ORS
targets do little to encourage collaborative arrangements and
shared outcomes such as clean water. Protecting rivers and lakes
from pollution cuts across the functional and spatial responsibili-
ties of government, and cross-boundary partnership working is an
obvious but largely unmet need.
Marquis et al., 2011, deﬁne bureaucratic alignment as “the extent
to which the structure of the government allows national development
strategies and policies to be consistently and effectively implemented”
(pg. 41). Another obstacle to improved environmental protection
can be overlap in responsibilities and competition for authority (or
‘turf wars’) within the regulatory structure (Ellis and Turner, 2008).
For example, responsibilities for environmental issues are primar-
ily divided in two. At provincial and county levels, Environment
Protection Bureaus are responsible for industry-associated pollu-
tion and Agricultural Bureaus are responsible for pollution caused
by agriculture and for rural environment conservation. However, in
practice matters become more complex. For example, for
pesticides “the Ministry of Agriculture monitors ﬁeld use, the state
planner and the Commerce Ministry grant production licenses, the
Ministry of Health is responsible for setting maximum residue levels,
and the State Environmental Protection Administration monitors
environmental impacts” (Reuters, 2007, cited in Ellis and Turner,
2008, p. 26). Similarly, responsibility for regulating soil and water
quality is spread across the Ministry of Environmental Protection,
the Ministry of Land Resources, the Ministry of Water Resources
and the Ministry of Agriculture; each having varied and over-
lapping responsibilities (World Bank, 2006; FORHEAD, 2014).
Policies and measures relating to land-use planning and zoning
similarly emanate from different agencies and are not well
integrated (Yeh et al., 2011). Deﬁciencies in communication,
coordination and data sharing amongst agencies can result in poor
implementation and enforcement of policy. Constraints to
publication and sharing of data are a signiﬁcant barrier to
improved agency cooperation and environmental management.
Meta-data and sampling methods are rarely made accessible to
other users, whilst internally awareness is lacking of other data
available (FORHEAD, 2014).
Frequently the goals of rival agencies are contradictory.
Notionally there should be a balance of power between those
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concerned with environmental protection and those focused on
economic development, but with the compliance of local and
central government the authority of the latter typically wins over
that of the former (Tao, 2011). For example, provincial govern-
ments, the Ministry of Environment Protection, and economic
development agencies such as the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology and the Ministry of Commerce are at the
same bureaucratic level without power over their counterpart
agencies (Marquis et al., 2011). It can similarly be the case for
economic development agencies and environmental protection
agencies within local governments.
Another dimension of ‘decoupling’ is inadequacy in govern-
mental and societal mechanisms for monitoring government
agencies and private enterprises with respect to policy and
regulatory compliance (Marquis et al., 2011). Information disclo-
sure and transparency standards should allow both higher
government and civil society to monitor actions. For example,
the ORS provides no formal mechanism for citizen participation.
Although some local governments have begun surveying public
satisfaction with government performance as part of the perfor-
mance management process, public participation generally
remains limited to a passive role of ‘information provider’ with
little inﬂuence on performance evaluation and decision making
(Burns and Zhou, 2010). The lack of transparency and varied
instances of corruption at local level has led processors and
farmers to distrust local oversight or regulation (Ellis and Turner,
2008). Lack of transparency also applies to private and government
enterprises. Without established standards for reporting, many
ﬁrms can be accused of ‘greenwashing’ their outcomes (Marquis
et al., 2011).
Compared with most other policy areas, environmental
protection does demonstrate a positive role played by civil society.
Environmental NGOs have remained acceptable to government by
deliberately and strategically acting in a non-confrontational and
politically neutral manner, and like other NGOs are subject to
restrictions on taking collective action or acting on behalf of
interested groups. Despite these limitations they have gained
inﬂuence which cannot be ignored completely by decision makers.
NGOs that specialize in organic agriculture, rural development, and
sustainable development exist, but similarly are pragmatic in their
focus on non-political roles of information provision and producer
advice. Political tensions do remain, particularly where environ-
mental issues relate to the rights of citizens, and the government
remains wary of environmental activism (Tao, 2011). A multilateral
and open system of environmental regulation and management
has certainly yet to form (Wang and Wang, 2011). As a consequence
economic incentive instruments, market mechanisms and action
by civil society remain weak alternatives to direct administrative
control.
2.2. Agricultural sector policy barriers
China's agricultural support policy is in a transitional stage. In a
developing economy agriculture typically contributes a large share
of GDP and employment, and purchase of food accounts for a high
proportion of household expenditure. Thus agricultural support
policy aims to ensure food security, rising farm incomes and farm
employment through increasing productivity of land. Once growth
has been achieved in the non-farm sector (at least in some regions)
transition in policy becomes necessary to support increase in farm
labour productivity (e.g. through increasing farm size and
mechanisation) as labour leaves the agricultural sector for
employment in industry and urban areas. Greater priority then
also tends to be given to environmental protection. Policy needs in
China are complicated by the geographic scale and spatial diversity
of its economy. Nearly 97% of poor people live in rural areas
(Ni, 2013), and agricultural support policy retains the objective of
reducing poverty by supporting small farmer livelihoods. This is
said to be reinforced by a sense of a ‘national debt’ to farmers as it
was the household responsibility system and growth in the
agricultural sector that led to China’s unprecedented growth since
1980 (Ma, 2014). Support to agriculture primarily aims to meet
domestic needs, but accession to the WTO and international trade
commitments will hasten further reform in agricultural policy.
2.2.1. Agricultural support policies
Agricultural support policies primarily consist of direct pay-
ments for grain production, a general subsidy for agricultural
inputs, a subsidy for adoption of improved crop varieties, a farm
machinery purchase subsidy, minimum grain purchasing prices,
temporary storage options and some environmental protection
measures (Ni, 2013). Direct payments for grain production were
introduced in 2004 in response to production declines, signalling a
switch from sector taxation via price controls to subsidy (Gale
et al., 2005). There are differences by province and grain type, but
most payments are based on taxable land area certiﬁed in the
agricultural tax reform which tends to remain constant, rather
than actual area planted to grain (Ni, 2013). Since 2006 a general
subsidy for agricultural inputs has been provided to reduce
production costs and relieve the effects of price ﬂuctuations for
grain production inputs such as diesel fuel, fertilizer, pesticides,
plastic sheeting and other materials. The amount is based on past
production practice and prevailing input prices. In most provinces
the subsidy is received as a direct annual payment via the same
channel (usually credited to bank accounts) as the payment for
grain production. Huang et al., 2009, state that this subsidy
amounted to less that 1% of output value in 2005 and was
insigniﬁcant in terms of market distortion and production
decisions. The subsidy amounted to about USD 14.5 per farm
household in 2007 (Beckman et al., 2009), but had increased by a
factor of three by 2010 (Li et al., 2013). However, it is said to be
‘barely noticed’ by farmers when credited to their bank accounts
(Huang, 2014).
Farmers can receive the subsidy for improved varieties either as
a direct payment based on growing area or via discounted retail
seed prices. For the farm machinery subsidy, farmers pay a
discounted price with the price difference settled between the
government and suppliers (Ni, 2013). Minimum grain purchasing
prices were introduced in 2005 and 2006 for rice and wheat
respectively in major grain producing areas. When the unregulated
market price is lower than the minimum purchase price,
government authorities purchase grain at the minimum purchase
price (which was set before sowing). When the market price is
higher the programme is dormant. Grain purchased is stored until
market prices rise, providing modest intervention against ﬂuctua-
tions in farm-gate prices and farm incomes.
Although in aggregate the level, number and scope of
agricultural support policies has risen in recent years, because
of the large rural population the value of support per capita and per
farming household remains relatively low. There are regional
differences in the implementation and outcomes of policies, but
estimates are that government support and subsidies typically
provide Chinese farmers with around 5–6% of their income, a far
lower proportion than in most developed economies (OECD, 2011;
Ni, 2013). Most farmers are said not to know the exact amount of
farmland being subsidized or the standard for calculating it, and
simply accept changes to the subsidy amount received (Ni, 2013;
Huang, 2014). In addition it is common that farmers in many areas
may sublease their land to others but still receive the subsidies
(Chen, 2011; Ni, 2013). Minimum price and temporary storage
programmes have marginal impact on output prices given the
volumes purchased and stored compared to total domestic
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production, and are implemented primarily in the interests of farm
income and food security. Together with the level of aggregate
support described above, all of these factors indicate that
agricultural support, and most speciﬁcally payments for grain
production and input subsidies, act as direct income subsidies
de-coupled from crop production decisions including fertilizer use
(Gale et al., 2005; Chen, 2011; Ni, 2013; Huang, 2014). This cannot
be stated absolutely as all farm income support is fungible, and the
extent to which these policies reduce income and output price risk
may encourage more intensive use of inputs. Also, while the
subsidies may have little direct inﬂuence on farmers' production
decisions they nevertheless contribute to farm incomes and may
make farming structures and traditional spatial patterns and
production practices proﬁtable enough to inhibit a more rapid
transition to more efﬁcient and higher value production systems.
This supports aims of self-sufﬁciency in grains and rural poverty
reduction, but may contribute to persistence of excessive use of
fertilizer in intensively farmed areas.
2.2.2. Fertilizer industry subsidies
Since 2009 the fertilizer sector in China has become largely
de-regulated and market-oriented in so far as all price controls
have been removed with the exception of tariffs for managing
trade to prevent domestic shortages. However, four signiﬁcant
subsidy programmes remain in place, most taking effect since the
mid-2000s (Li et al., 2013). These are: exemption from electricity
price increases for fertilizer manufacturing plants; exemptions
from price increases and certain charges for rail transport costs;
exemption from value added tax (VAT); and a credit subsidy for
enterprises providing six months storage of fertilizer as a reserve to
stabilize supply and minimize peak shortage.
Together with the general farm input subsidy described in
Section 2.2.1 above these programmes provided the fertilizer
industry with a total subsidy of USD 0.95 billion in 2003, rising to
18.76 billion in 2010 (Li et al., 2013). This level of subsidy has had a
number of impacts. Rapid growth in the fertilizer industry, and a
proliferation of producers and distributors, has created employ-
ment but led to low levels of manufacturing efﬁciency compared to
international standards and variability in the quality of output.
Scarcities existed prior to the 1990s, but since then availability and
affordability of fertilizers has not been an issue for farmers. Despite
the removal of price caps in 2009 the subsidies to the sector have
ensured that fertilizer prices have remained relatively low and
stable. For example, since the 1970s, farmers have paid 50–75% less
for urea fertilizer than the world market price (Li et al., 2013). Some
authors assert that this has contributed to excessive fertilizer use
and thus to DWPA (Sun et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013). Others cite
estimates of highly price inelastic demand for fertilizer (e.g. Liu and
Sheng, 2012; Huang et al., 2012b), and the issue merits further
rigorous research.
2.2.3. A lack of adequate environmental regulation
Water quality standards for each major reach of river exist,
deﬁned on the basis 23 parameters and ﬁve categories of chemical
quality related to the designated use of the water. With the
addition of total nitrogen and phosphorus the same parameters
and grades apply to lakes (OECD, 2007). However, for DWPA there
is a lack of well-deﬁned and matching regulations for agricultural
nutrient management. Provinces produce guidelines but these
remain advisory and non-enforceable. Another deﬁciency is a lack
of regulation of quality control in the manufacture of chemical
fertilizers. Several government agencies have relevant responsi-
bilities but there are no consistent well deﬁned standards for
product registration, labelling, monitoring and quality. Distribu-
tion of poor quality and mis-labelled products is a continual
problem (Li et al., 2013). There is similarly a lack of sufﬁciently tight
controls on the discharge of organic waste from livestock and
poultry farms. Environmental protection regulations for livestock
production need to be established relative to potential to increase
waste treatment and utilization of manures, the livestock carrying
capacity of the land, waste storage and disposal requirements, and
the need for riparian buffer zones (Sun et al., 2012). A national
policy is needed to establish the infrastructure necessary to collect,
store, treat, distribute and apply organic wastes from concentrated
livestock feeding operations to smallholder farms, thus assisting
farmers to reduce chemical fertilizer use and improve soil organic
matter content (Li et al., 2013).
2.2.4. Deﬁciencies in agricultural research and extension services
The Department of Extension of the Ministry of Agriculture is
responsible for both agricultural education management and
environment protection education (Chen and Huang, 2001). The
solutions to excessive fertilizer use most commonly advocated in
the literature are improvements to the structure and performance
of extension services (e.g. Sun et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013; Garnet and
Wilkes, 2014). Recent studies are critical of the current state of
public agricultural extension following successive reforms since
the 1980s. Huan et al., 2010, describe a crisis in extension as despite
new technologies being demanded by farmers, state research and
advice provision has become less responsive to need, whilst other
important factors such as market access and information receive
insufﬁcient attention. Typically at provincial and municipal levels,
and in some counties, functional specialisation and sub-sector
divisions remain in place, even though at township level, a single
station usually now implements all extension activities. According
to Ma et al., 2013, the extension system is still responding to the
reforms and has become fragmented. It has many different
stakeholders, each with varying roles, knowledge, objectives and
policy instruments relevant to nutrient management. The Ministry
of Agriculture and its Bureaus of Agriculture still exert a dominant
inﬂuence through the extension system and provision of subsidies,
whilst the private sector, universities and research institutes also
engage in in technology development and transfer, but without
much coordination and scientiﬁc consensus (Ma et al., 2013).
Regardless of paymaster, extension agents tend to have a relatively
low education level and limited training in modern communica-
tion techniques. Resource use efﬁciency and environmental
protection tend to remain low on the political agenda in rural
areas (for reasons considered in Section 2.1.4 above), which
hinders any coordinated efforts to develop a coherent nutrient
management strategy and policies to improve nutrient use
efﬁciency by farmers.
The ‘crisis’ in extension includes the cost to the public purse.
While past reforms have favoured a focus on individual production
units (i.e. households and farms, not ‘production brigades’), there
remains a strongly hierarchical structure, with authority and
prioritisation linked to the production and growth ethos in both
the extension service and local government. Until corrected,
reforms to extension from the late 1980s reinforced this
production ethos by enhancing commercial incentives for many
public as well as private extension agents to promote intensive use
of agricultural inputs. Overall the functional divisions and failures
suggested by the literature indicate that current provision for
agricultural extension is poorly equipped to meet the needs for
horizontal coordination, integrated assessment, and integrated
design and implementation of management measures for mitiga-
tion of DWPA. However, at village level functions and approaches
may be more integrated, and despite technical capacity limitations,
there may be some scope for the emergence of a more holistic
approach. Provision of education and advice must address the
whole farm as a business, taking account of the objectives of the
farming family. Advice to increase production alone is no longer
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sufﬁcient, and greater account must be taken of managing costs,
labour use and environmental impacts. Finally it can be noted that
both a lack of relevant regulation and publicly available monitoring
data for ground and surface water quality, means that there are no
‘baselines’ against which to set advice and training for good
farming practice in relation to control of DWPA.
A speciﬁc lacuna for improved nutrient management is
widespread farmer adoption of fertilizer use recommendations
based on adequate soil testing. The Ministry of Agriculture’s
National Soil Testing and Fertilizer Program involves testing soil
properties and crop nutrition needs to make location and crop
speciﬁc fertilizer use recommendations (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014).
Appropriate compound fertilizer formulations are then produced
by participating fertilizer manufacturers and supplied with
guidance to farmers. To date improved monitoring is needed to
fully evaluate the impact of this programme. Some research
suggests that in regions where participation rates are high,
signiﬁcant reductions in N fertilizer use have been achieved
(Sun and Huang, 2012; Garnet and Wilkes, 2014). From ﬁeld visits
and expert opinion it is clear, however, that in most regions of
China a soil testing regime of adequate frequency and spatial
resolution is lacking. Correspondingly, unbalanced nutrient ratios
in compound fertilizers can cause acidiﬁcation, secondary
salinization and reduction of microbial activity in soils, reducing
yields and possibly inducing farmers to apply even more fertilizers
to try and compensate for the reduced soil productivity (Sun et al.,
2012; Shen et al., 2005).
2.3. Structural barriers
China's economy exhibits a dualistic economic structure in
which an increasingly modern urban and industrial economy co-
exists with a relatively traditional rural economy comprised
mainly of small-scale agricultural production units. Infrastructure
and services in urban areas are generally well-developed while
those of the rural areas lag behind, and the average income and
consumption levels of urban residents are signiﬁcantly higher than
that of most rural residents (Ni, 2013). From this situation emerges
a number of structural barriers to improved nutrient management
in agriculture and mitigation of DWPA.
2.3.1. Small-scale farming, land fragmentation and constraints to
consolidation and coordination
Farming in China is dominated by smallholder farmers, with on
average only around 0.7 hectares of farmland (Lowder et al., 2014).
There is variation, but even in the most land-abundant province
(Heilongjiang) the average is only 3 hectares per household.
Agriculture remains the main source of livelihood for a rural
population of approximately 185 million households and 670 mil-
lion people although its importance as a share of total and net
household income has declined during the last decade as the share
of income from off-farm employment has increased. Farmers in the
thirteen major grain producing provinces remain those amongst
the farming population most dependent upon agriculture as a
source of income. The average annual net income per head of
farmers in 2010 was RMB 5919 (USD 874) compared to the national
poverty line of RMB 2300 (Ni, 2013). Thus many farming
households have an income below this average, and make up a
high proportion of the 128 million people who exist below the
poverty line nationally. Small farm scale and low levels of farm
income have implications for farmer behaviour and measures to
mitigate DWPA.
Land use rights were given to rural households in the late 1970s
with the dissolution of collective farming and introduction of the
household responsibility system. This stimulated growth in
productivity but also resulted in fragmentation of land holdings.
Resulting operational inefﬁciencies contribute to low farm income
and low capital investment, and can preclude adoption of more
advanced management of inputs and impede bulk application of
organic manures. Small and fragmented holdings (and transfer of
farm labour to non-farm employment) have been associated in
some areas with higher rates of nutrient application (Tan et al.,
2008).
Fragmentation of holdings persists because of continuing
prohibition of the sale of farmland, although consolidation can
increasingly be achieved through a range of rental and transfer
arrangements (Huang et al., 2012a). In relation to food safety,
Waldron et al., 2006, argue that the pace of farm consolidation is
also limited by government commitment to maintaining small
farmers' access to markets for reasons of livelihood and rural social
security. This limits the compliance-related costs of higher food
safety (or environmental protection) that can be imposed on
smallholders before they are forced out of markets (FORHEAD,
2014).
Horizontal coordination is another potential strategy for
overcoming problems associated with a small-scale, low income
and fragmented agrarian structure. However, marketing and
processing of agricultural produce also tends to be fragmented
in China. Marketing and processing of many agricultural commod-
ities is dominated by small scale and mobile traders or companies
who purchase products from villages and transport these to market
or processing plant (Gale and Hu, 2012; Thompson and Hu, 2007).
Farmer cooperatives could help to overcome such constraints but
are generally still at an early stage of development, although
supported by government policy.
An alternative strategy for coordination and consolidation in
farming are so-called ‘dragon-head enterprises’ (FORHEAD, 2014).
These are scale producers supported by government to encourage
vertical integration. Such companies may provide inputs, technical
advice, processing and better access to markets. Typically they
engage in contract farming with households and invest in
infrastructure for input supply, processing, storage and marketing.
Such companies and cooperatives are not mutually exclusive, and
could beneﬁcially contract with each other (FORHEAD, 2014), but
modalities for such coordination are not well understood and
developed across commodities and farming sub-sectors. Other
forms of contracting to achieve scale in farming operations are also
emerging. Examples include: ﬁrms contracting with villages to
consolidate land holdings which can then be directly farmed and
managed by the agribusiness; farmers working on their own land
contracted to produce the same crop for a given company; or a
company renting village land and then employing farmers to
produce for them using speciﬁed inputs and methods (Calvin et al.,
2006).
2.3.2. Other structural trends in the agricultural economy
As productivity has risen, agricultural specialization and spatial
concentration exhibits a shift from mixed crop and livestock
farming to monocultural agriculture in many regions (Garnet and
Wilkes, 2014; FORHEAD, 2014). For example, rice and maize
production in eastern and northeast regions, pork and poultry
close to the more urbanised southeast and dairy production in the
grasslands of northern regions (Garnet and Wilkes, 2014). There
also tends to be concentration of vegetable production and
conﬁned livestock feeding operations in peri-urban areas. Such
spatial specialisation in commodities has environmental implica-
tions as the decline in mixed crop-livestock systems means that
livestock farming becomes ‘disconnected’ from arable farming.
There is then insufﬁcient surrounding crop production to absorb
and beneﬁt from nutrient surpluses from livestock (Garnet and
Wilkes, 2014). As well as being a major source of polluting wastes,
the livestock sector accounts for an increasing proportion of crop
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use, and thus with increasing meat and dairy consumption drives
an increasing proportion of crop-related environmental impacts
(Garnet and Wilkes, 2014).
2.3.3. Demographic constraints and farmer characteristics
Demographic changes in China are affecting the organization of
agricultural production in ways that impact on the potential for
improved environmental protection. Rural-urban migration for
employment, particularly by male able-bodied workers, and
ageing of the rural (and general) population is reducing the labour
force available for farming. Even if they remain in the countryside
fewer people of working age now work in agriculture, and where
alternative employment is available the opportunity cost of
working on one's own farm or as an agricultural labourer has
risen. The result is that farming is now often the responsibility of
women with young children and/or the elderly, or is managed in
short periods of farm labour, when workers return for peak periods
such as sowing and harvesting. In some areas women make up
70–80% of agricultural labour, and are often middle-aged with
limited education and lower wage rates than men (Cao and
Birchenall, 2013; Song and Vernooy, 2010). Agricultural support
policies, research, technology development and extension may
rarely consider the speciﬁc needs, objectives and expertise of
women (Vernooy, 2012). A feminised and ageing workforce may
require increased mechanisation and training to substitute for
manual labour, and land policies that take account of the current
transition whilst evolving towards a consolidated and modernised
structure for agricultural production.
Shortages of adult farm labour thus contribute to the adoption
of chemical fertilizer and pesticides as labour-saving technologies.
One of the main barriers to effective utilisation of organic manures
as a source of nutrients is the shortage of labour for their transport
and application in bulk (Chadwick et al., 2012). There is increasing
diversity in labour availability and use in agriculture, for example,
from still relatively labour intensive small-scale protected
horticulture, through a paid labour force for large agri-businesses,
to displacement of labour by mechanisation.
These changing patterns of rural demography and employment
affect the use of farm inputs and incentives to engage in
sustainable farming practices in complex ways which merit
further research (Holdaway, 2014; FORHEAD, 2014). For example,
farmers are likely to apply fertilizer in a single application rather
than using split applications which need more labour (Sun et al.,
2012). Such single applications are likely to be made in excess and
will be vulnerable to losses through leaching and surface runoff
before uptake by the crop, whereas split (or possibly slow-release)
applications will usually result in higher nutrient use efﬁciency
(particularly where also well matched with irrigation regimes).
2.4. Behavioural barriers
The excessive use of fertilizers on many Chinese farms appears
to be economically irrational, both from a private farm income
perspective, and from a social perspective when account is taken of
the costs of DWPA. The sections above have identiﬁed a wide range
of factors beyond the control of farmers that inﬂuence or constrain
their behaviour in relation to fertilizer use. This section considers
the objectives of rural households and how this may inﬂuence
farmer decision making.
2.4.1. Farm household objectives and risk aversion
As noted above, extensive fertilizer trials in China have provided
estimates of the yield maximizing, or agronomic optimum
application rate for fertilizer under a wide range of conditions.
However, as also noted, data available are not necessarily
comprehensive and up to date. In particular, crop varieties
developed in recent years may require more nutrients and higher
management levels, justifying higher rates of fertilizer to reach the
optimum agronomic efﬁciency (Sun et al., 2012). The economic
optimum (proﬁt maximising) fertilizer application rate will be less
than the agronomic optimum, as determined by the point at which
diminishing marginal returns to increased fertilizer use match the
incremental costs of that additional use. Farmers can be expected
to aim to approximate this economic optimum, unless their
behaviour is dominated by extension advice based on the
agronomic optimum application rate.
Complicating this assumption are the other objectives that may
inﬂuence a farmer’s decision making. Considered foremost in the
literature is risk, and the assumption that small-scale farmers with
low incomes dependent on farming in particular, will be risk averse.
Inrelation to risk and nutrient use inagriculture, two maincategories
of risks can be identiﬁed: environmental and economic risks.
Economic risk is mainly related to the risk that reducing the amount
of fertilizers could result in yield loss and therefore proﬁt reduction.
Therefore, the over application of fertilizers can be perceived by
farmers as a risk reducing activity, in other words an insurance
mechanism to guaranteeat leastaverageyield (SriRamaratnam et al.,
1987; Babcock, 1992; Yang et al., 2012; Stuart et al., 2014).
Environmental risk should have the opposite effect, i.e. excessive
use of fertilizers could result in negative environmental impacts
including soil degradation, climate change impacts, and water
pollution (Han and Zhao, 2009; Wauters et al., 2010; Stuart et al.,
2014). Given the wide incidence of environmental costs across
society (compared to private costs for the farmer) and probableweak
knowledge of these costs, economic risk linked to nutrient use and
yield loss (as well as associated with adoption of new conservation
practices and technologies) can be expected to dominate farmers’
decisions over environmental risk. Economic risk aversion can thus
be a cause of excessive use of nutrients, and an inﬂuence for farmers’
decisions on adoption of environmental mitigation strategies
(Pannell, 1991; Morris and Potter, 1995; Aimin, 2010; Bowman
and Zilberman, 2013; Stuart et al., 2014).
Farmers’ attitude towards risk and the degree to which their
decision making is risk averse will depend on a range of factors.
These include: the level, security and degree of diversiﬁcation of
farm household income; the quality of a farmer's information and
knowledge about output risk (as affected by weather, pests,
disease, irrigation shortage etc.), agricultural input use and
effectiveness, and environmental risk; the degree of trust in
extension agents or other sources of advice; and the farmer’s level
of education. For instance, Han and Zhao, 2009, demonstrate that
there is a negative relationship between fertilizer application and
farmers' education level and knowledge of environmental impact.
Babcock, 1992, shows that increasing uncertainty about soil
nitrogen concentration and weather conditions usually increases
nitrogen applications beyond the rates that would occur under
certainty. Sheriff, 2005, argues that trust and a farmer's
perceptions of agronomic advice will inﬂuence the rate of fertilizer
application. If farmers perceive that the suggested rate of
fertilization is too conservative, or that the recommendations of
extension advisors under-estimate crop response in their ﬁelds,
they may over-apply relative to the recommendation. Evidence is
cited that farmers systematically over-estimate the impact of
additional nitrogen relative to agronomists' recommendations
(Sherrif, 2005). Chadwick et al., 2012, note that farmers lack
knowledge of the nutrient content of organic manures such as
composted manure products, and animal manures are often
applied to land, either as fertilizer or as a means of disposal,
without adequate accounting for nutrient content applied or risks
incurred. Farmers’ perceptions and knowledge of fertilizer use, its
proﬁtability and associated environmental risk are obviously key
factors inﬂuencing excessive use of crop nutrients in China.
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2.4.2. Farm household objectives, rural social security and
urbanisation in China
As identiﬁed above, the agricultural sector performs a range of
social and cultural functions in the dualistic Chinese economy,
providing important positive externalities for society, but often at
the cost of efﬁciency and negative externalities for the environ-
ment. The absorption capacity of the cities for rural-urban
migrants may be declining (Ni, 2013) and certainly when the
economy ﬂuctuates agriculture can help buffer the impact by
providing at least basic food security and income to returning
migrant workers. For example, many migrant workers went back
to farming after the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 (Ni, 2013), taking
advantage of the alternative social security mechanism provided
by access to land and/or casual agricultural employment. The need
for rural areas to provide at least minimum social security
arrangements for migrant workers is reinforced by their living and
working conditions in cities, and by their legal status. Migrants are
a vulnerable population in urban areas because of low incomes
(further reduced by remittances to family remaining in the home
village), long working hours and poor housing conditions, often all
provided by the informal sector (FORHEAD, 2014). Poor urban
residents in neighbourhoods with limited social infrastructure are
similarly vulnerable but migrant workers are particularly so, and
also less likely to have access to medical and other social services,
frequently living in more densely concentrated conditions in old or
peripheral areas of cities with more limited access to drinking
water, heating, waste disposal and other services (Holdaway,
2014).
Although the policy is undergoing progressive liberalisation
(Economist, 2014a), rights to settlement, and access to public
services and certain types of employment are often still tied to a
person’s residence registration (hukou), which speciﬁes both an
administrative jurisdiction and rural/urban status (FORHEAD,
2014). Full access to schools and hospitals in the cities at
subsidised rates requires an urban hukou, but birth in a rural area
provides a rural hukou (for parents and their children); a status
which has been difﬁcult and costly to change (Economist, 2014a).
Only 36% of China’s total population are urban hukou holders
(Economist, 2014a). The system is a hangover from a centrally
planned system under which the key differentiation was the
source of a person’s grain supply (FORHEAD, 2014). People could
not live in cities without state provided resources, whereas rural
residents were assumed to be at least self-sufﬁcient in basic food
supply. In pre and post reform periods the system has been
partially effective as a means of controlling rural-urban migration
(Yeh et al., 2011), but discrimination against migrants without an
urban hukou remains a barrier in terms of access to social
protection (Chan and Buckingham, 2008).
Although whole family migration is becoming more common,
access to education in urban areas remains in doubt, and many
migrants maintain two households, sending remittances home to
support children, wives or elderly parents in the countryside
(FORHEAD, 2014). Migrants from rural areas may dislike the
discrimination in cities, but many may doubt the social security of
an urban hukou even if offered (Economist, 2014a). These doubts
include whether new, rapidly expanding and still imperfect urban
welfare systems will provide unemployment beneﬁts or a
promised pension to often still transient workers. Dependents of
migrants who remain in rural areas also clearly retain needs for
care in that location, as may retiring migrants returning to rural life
carrying the health impacts of life in urban areas (Holdaway, 2014).
Thus migrants tend to “keep one foot in the countryside, holding onto
their tiny patch of land and never making the break” (Economist,
2014a). Farming and traditional ways of living provide a more
reliable source of unemployment and pension security, and at least
some access to education and healthcare in rural areas. A small
parcel of land provides a ‘buffer’ for migrant workers of more than
just employment and food security. This is relevant to concerns
about nutrient management and DWPA because anecdotal
evidence suggests this as an explanation for minimisation of farm
management input. Fertilizer and other agro-chemical inputs are
utilised as conveniently as possible, to minimise labour input and/
or the expertise needed from elderly ‘caretakers’ of the land.
Where urban work is well paid, both farm input costs and farm
proﬁt generated may be increasingly insigniﬁcant compared to the
labour opportunity cost of the migrant head of household (or other
migrant family members), but an interest in farming is sustained
for the reasons explored here. Secondly as a barrier to DWPA, even
if migrants did wish to sell their land they are not able to do so.
Although alternative mechanisms for land consolidation are
emerging, this may hinder development of modern farms of
sufﬁcient scale to be well managed for both production and
environmental protection.
3. Conclusions and ways forward
Through its comprehensive approach this review has identiﬁed
many factors that constrain improved fertilizer management and
mitigation of DWPA in China. These include drivers of poor
nutrient management that derive from deﬁciencies in policy
approaches, as well as from economic and social structural
characteristics and dynamics of the rural economy. The resulting
synthesis is broader and deeper than other assessments of the
nutrient management challenge in China to date.
The analysis conﬁrms that DWPA cannot be addressed by single
regulatory or policy measures alone. There is a need to develop a
mitigation framework that encompasses clear policy directives
from central government, facilitating governance arrangements at
local level, an enabling regulatory environment, horizontal and
vertical coordination in food supply chains, incentives for
protection of water resources by farmers (unbiased by other
sector policies), and enhanced agricultural, food safety and
environmental education for both farmers and consumers. Lack
of adequate, reliable and universally accessible urban and rural
social security systems comes at a cost in terms of agricultural
efﬁciency and environmental impact. Effectively managing the
environmental impacts of changes in the farming sector will
require not only integrated policy measures but also the
engagement of multiple actors beyond government. Thus NGOs,
the media, water suppliers, industry and consumers can all play
important roles in developing a comprehensive mitigation
framework for DWPA. At the centre of the mitigation framework
must be policies to give farmers economic incentives to raise
fertilizer use efﬁciency and make it possible for them to adopt the
most efﬁcient technologies (Zhang and Powlson, 2012). In turn this
must be supported by an adequate scientiﬁc knowledge base.
Positive trends are identiﬁable in a number of relevant respects.
For example, the 12th ﬁve year plan (2011–2016) emphasizes the
need for environmental quality improvement in rural areas
(Li et al., 2013). The gap between environmental regulation and
enforcement may also be closing (‘re-coupling’) through shifts in
government priorities and leader incentives, governmental reor-
ganization, and increasing pressure for transparency and monitor-
ing (Burns and Zhou, 2010; Marquis et al., 2011; Economist, 2014b).
Improvement will inevitably take time and be uneven, and will
require capacity building at county and township levels (FORHEAD,
2014).
There is also a strong consensus emerging that increasing the
scale of production can help in addressing environmental impacts
(Shen et al., 2013; Garnet and Wilkes, 2014). The 2013 ‘Number One
Document’ envisaged strengthening of land rights as a means of
supporting development of large-scale family farms and agricultural
L.E.D. Smith, G. Siciliano / Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 209 (2015) 15–25 23
cooperatives and other recent policy announcements indicate that
further reforms of land rights may enable farmers to transfer or
mortgage contracted land and to convert land use rights into shares
in large-scale farming operations (FORHEAD, 2014). Concentrating
nutrient management in larger-scale farm operations will facilitate
application of precision management techniques, investment in
waste facilities (e.g., manure management systems), and will
facilitate both provision of extension advice and monitoring of
guidelines and regulations. Mechanisation associated with large
holdings can address scarcities of agricultural labour that contribute
to deﬁciencies in management of farm inputs. Furthermore, farmers
are becoming ever-more self-organising, creating the potential for
new institutions for agricultural and rural development (Huan et al.,
2010). However, more research is required to understand the
environmental impacts of production at different scales and in
differentmanagement systems, with andwithout integration of crop
and livestock production. More research is also needed into how
supply chain coordination strategies can develop for different
commodities in ways which can beneﬁt farm incomes, consumer
standards and the environment.
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